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The debenture accounts of Czechoslovakia's Skoda Works for
1930 record a purchase of three of their London sterling issue bonds
by Dr. Richard Weiner, Prague. This entry is a part of a story of
moderate professional success, of an admixture of faith in the strength
of a new nation, in its vast munitions works, and of the bitterness of
centuries of persecution which, in the midst of Europe's resurging anti-
Semitism, caused cautious investment. For Dr. Weiner had bought
these bonds through his Prague bank, the Anglo-Prague Credit Bank,
with the stipulation that the actual purchase be made by the bank's
London branch to be kept there on deposit, and that no evidence of
the whereabouts of this deposit be left in writing. He died in 1935,
leaving his entire estate to his sister, Mrs. Frankman. , Supplemental
to the inherited deposit contract stipulating that the bonds were pay-
able in Prague, by the Prague bank, Mrs. Frankman received a con-
ditions-of-business contract to the effect that the bonds were held for
her in London and subject to English law.
Mrs. Frankman escaped the Aryan wave and died in England in
1945. The administrator of her estate turned to the London branch
bank for payment of the debenture deposit. Fear of retaliation against
family and friends in a newly totalitarianized Russia-oriented Czecho-
slovakia caused the officers of the London branch to ask for an English
court order. Their defense in the subsequent litigation was that such
payment would be illegal under Czechoslovakian exchange regulations,
in force for two decades, requiring a license for all such payments in
foreign currency by a Czechoslovakian citizen to a non-resident. The
King's Bench Division upheld their defense,' saying that the validity
of the second conditions-of-business contract, by the appropriate choice
of law under conflict of laws doctrine, would be determined by the law
of the "place of making," that Czechoslovakian law would hold the
contract invalid, that the "place of performance" was Czechoslovakia
in as much as the London branch was not a separate entity, that pay-
ment would have to be made in Prague, and that therefore the Czecho-
slovakian exchange restriction, as the law of the place of performance,
t A.B., Harvard University, 1945; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1950. Member,
Association des Auditeurs Awiemns, Hague Academy of International Law.
1. Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank, [1948] 1 All E.R. 337 (KB.).
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controls under traditional conflict of laws doctrine. The court further
said that such foreign exchange restrictions could not be disregarded
as contrary to English public policy because England and Czecho-
slovakia, as signatories of the International Monetary Fund were bound
to recognize such exchange controls.2
The case was first reviewed by the Court of Appeal.' It sought
to avoid giving effect to this foreign decree by resort to a conflicts
doctrine peculiar to England, the "proper law" doctrine: the intention
of the original contracting parties was that the contract was to be
governed by English law, English law would upheld the validity of
this contract-of-intention, therefore English law governs and the pay-
ment order issues-a neat double flip off the common law springboard!
But, on a second appeal, the House of Lords refused to follow this
nimble argument and, adopting the view of the Kings Bench Division
that Czech law controlled the contract and barred its performance,
reversed the decision and restored the judgment of the trial court.4
The history of the Franknun case affords an apt illustration of
the conflicting rules and policies at stake when the courts are faced
with the problem of the applicability of foreign exchange controls.
The convolutions of the Court of Appeal are not so devious or difficult
to master that other judges in other jurisdictions have not attempted
them in order to reach a result which to them seems more desirable.
I
From the exigencies of a modern economic world have emerged
a series of problems international in scope, reflecting national political
and legal oppositions, entangled in that bramblebush of heterogeneous
doctrinal legalisms aptly entitled conflict of laws.5 The draftsman of
a contract with international ramifications, wherever payment is in-
volved, whether it be as possible measure of damages or value, or
payment in a normal commercial transaction, is faced today with the
problems of how to avoid or give effect to existent- and possible future
foreign exchange controls, and of how to stipulate with assurance the
currency of payment and the law to be applied.6  From the sales con-
2. See infra at note 92 for further exposition of this argument.
3. [1948] 2 All E.R. 1025 (C.A.).
4. [1949] 2 All E.R. 671, sub nom. Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v.
Frankman.
5. The equivalent French terminology is conftit du droit, the German interna-
tionale Prvat-recht. Dicey has pointed out (CONFLiCT OF LAWS, 12-15 Moore's ed.
1896) that the supposed conflict is in reality fictitious except in the mind of the judge
and should be more properly termed "choice of law" or "international private law."
The point seems at best academic.
6. The determination of the measure of foreign currency debt is derivative from
the central problem at hand and can herein be treated only incidentally and without
specific separation. For further discussion as regards the effect of supervening cur-
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tract to the marriage contract he is constantly spooked by the phan-
tasmagoric vicissitudes of our national and international legal systems.
A foreign decree or enactment may become the excuse and legally
framed defense of the private contractor who finds it convenient to
avoid the contract; there is ample room for collusion with the govern-
ment, and it may be a tool for contravention of intergovernmental
obligations. A relatively substantial body of case law has formed
around this malignant growth, and has been most commonly dealt
with within the area of the conflict of laws. These traditional diffi-
culties have been many times multiplied by the construction of the
contraption known as foreign exchange control.
II
Exchange control, though probably put to use in virtually every
period of international commerce, has only recently become of prime
importance. The twentieth century has seen the introduction of the
modern sophisticated theories of international trade. The Keynesian
school and its successors have come to consider as normative a theory
of international trade well divorced from the golden days of the free
exchange rate and the little boat-loads of gold bullion conveniently
balancing the neat diagrams of the exponents of the classical school.
With a vastly more complicated economic world underscoring the
artificiality of national boundaries and the unequal distribution of the
resources of the world, the sensitivity of national economic and political
structures to international commerce has become increasingly apparent. 7
rency devaluation particularly of the United States' gold manipulations of the mid-
30's, see NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW §§ 22, 36 (1939). In Hartmann v. United
States, 65 F. Supp. 397 (Ct. Cl. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 842 (1947), plaintiff,
executor of a deceased resident of Switzerland, sued the United States for $1,053,132,
the difference between the alleged value in gold coin of certain United States Liberty
Loan Gold Bonds with interest, and the amount received therefor in devalued
currency; the court held for the United States in its interpretation of the 1935
Executive Order for redemption in legal tender, not gold, pursuant to the 1934 gold
standard abrogation, stating that the bonds were purchased in the United States,
to be performed on in the United States, so United States' law applies. See also
LAMBERT, UN PARkRE DE JURISPRUDENCE COMPARATIVE (1934), and infra note 46.
7. On the development of exchange controls in general, see: Egyes v. Magyar
Nemzeti Bank, 71 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), see infra at note 48, a case
typifying the growing problem and its connection to subsequent devaluation; DoMKE,
TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. 20,317 (1943); EvlrT, Ex-
CHANGE AND TRADE CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1945) ; COMMERCIAL POLICY
IN THE POST-WAR WORLD (League of Nations Publications IIA: Econ. & Financial
Comm.) (1945); REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL (League of Nations Publications
IIA: Econ. & Financial No. 10 (1938)) (an early study which throws up its classic
hands in horror at the vicious back-alley practices considered); SCHUMACHER,
The Lessons of Monetary Experience in GERMANY'S PRESENT CURRENCY SYSTEM,
203, 225 (Gayer ed. 1937); Bloch and Rosenberg, Current Problems of Freezing
Control, 11 FORD. L. REv. 71 (1942) ; Metzler, Exchange Rates and the International
Monetary Fund in 7 POST-WAR ECONOMC SrUIEs (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1947)) (a brief, lucid, statistical study) ; Nussbaum, Ex-
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Two lines may be traced to the fertilization and full flowering of ex-
change controls. With the world-wide depression of the last decade
the perhaps already latent imbalance of world trade became startlingly
emphasized. Probably in all cases the origin of the control can be
traced to a deterioration of the balance of payments.' In 1936 inter-
national exchange rates were relatively stable and the imposition of
exchange controls was restricted to certain states in Latin America
and Eastern Europe. But this balanced demand for foreign exchange
did not last long. The French franc and the English pound sterling
were gradually depreciating and, from this stagnation of depreciation,
emerged the structure of the exchange controls.
The modem master of the art of exchange restriction as a weapon
of economic warfare was unquestionably Nazi Germany.9 We must
surely pay her due homage, but the rest of us were not slow to learn,
and such restrictions are now almost universally employed. As per-
petuated after the war, exchange controls probably reflect rather than
create the baleful radiations of a feverish international economy.
Though the Bretton Woods Agreement recognizes the necessity for
these restrictions " they are to be withdrawn as soon as possible by
progressive stages.
The restrictions take on many varied attire, now cleverly dis-
guised in the mantle of benevolent commercial agreement, now un-
abashed and naked. Analysis of the degrees of exhibitionism is be-
yond our scope. Apparently there are no particularly comprehensive
studies of the effects of such restrictions,' but no very good case can
be made for their retention after the factors originally responsible for
their conception have quite apparently ceased to exist. Thus there
are decided retrogressive effects on international balance of payments in
that there is bound to be a discouragement of cross-border capital in-
vestment. The imposition of added difficulties in already risk-burdened
commerce may be determinatively stultifying. Furthermore there are
indications that exchange controls cause an inevitable overvaluation
which will decrease the exports of the country and discourage foreign
change Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421 (1950);
Rehbock, Note, 32 REVUE CRiTIQUE DE DaoIT INTERNATIONAL 478 (1937) (a sum-
mary of the early German devices) ; Note, 3 INTRAmURAL L. REV. 62 (1947) ; Note,
34 VA. L. REv. 697 (1948) ; Comment, 47 YALE LJ. 451 (1938).
8. See reference in REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL (League of Nations Pub-
lications IIA: Economic and Financial No. 10) 22 (1938).
9. See in particular Rehbock, Note, 32 REvUE CRITIQUE DE DROIr INTERNA-
TIoNAL 478 (1937). Much of the earlier body of case law in this area springs from
these German exchange controls.
10. See analysis infra at note 92.
11. In general, however, see references made in note 7 mtpra.
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trade even if devaluation has been superimposed. 2 It is of interest,
too, that the- current horrible held over our heads, "statism," was
appended as an evil derivative from exchange controls in 1938-under
its perhaps more subtle French equivalent, etatisation.3 Constructive
criticism of our current contortions is at best speculative-it generally
succumbs to the temptations of negation. However, it is difficult to
see how any direct positive operation on these restrictions, even ad-
mitting their essential evil, can be of particular merit given a chronic
imbalance of world trade. Indeed speculative surgery on the latter
becomes yet more platitudinous.
III
And now the Law.
In 1901 Edward VII was to celebrate his coronation with a
splendid parade. One Krell had assured himself of later conversational
popularity by renting the use of an excellent vantage point, the second
floor window of Mr. Henry's Victoria Street shop. It must have
rained, for there was no parade. And Mr. Henry hung on to his pre-
payments. Krell was litigious and the King's Bench Division saw his
point of view, for they bucked the hitherto undisturbed flow of the
common law and read into the rental contract an implied condition
that the parade actually take place. Krell v. Henry ' is one of the
famous series of Coronation Cases which represents the first mitigation
of the old common law rule that impossibility of performance is not a
defense to a breach of contract. 5 It has been doctrinalized under the
descriptive term "frustration." Other exceptions have appeared to the
original prohibition, probably all stemming from Krell's argument of
implied condition, and have been adopted in various forms in most of
the civil law jurisdictions as well. 6 Within this doctrine of frustra-
tion has developed the concept of illegality-supervening impossibility
12. Thus a caveat to those who find a too ready panacea in recent pound and
franc devaluation.
13. In particular, reference is made to REPORT oN EXCHANGE CONTROL (League
of Nations Publications II A: Economic and Financial No. 10) 37 (1938).
14. [19031 2 K-B. 740.
15. This, of course, is treated in all the contract treatises. See, e.g.: POLLOCK,
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTS 236 et seq. (11th ed. 1942) ; CHESHIRE AND FIFoOT, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 366 et seq. (1945); WI.soN, CONTRACTS § 1931 et seq.;
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 454 et seq. See also: Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep.
897 (1648) (representing the unexpected common law position); Bathurst, Adjust-
-ment on Discharge of a Contract by Supervening Impossibility Under English Law,
11 J.B.A.D.C. 246 (1944); Morris and Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Contract,
56 L.Q. REv. 320-339 (1940); Zepos, Frustration of Contract in Comparative Law
and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, 11 MoD. L. REv. 36 (1948) ; Note, 3 IN-
TA RAL L. REv. 62 (1947); Note, 89 SOL. J. 76 (1945).
16. The Scandinavian Sale of Goods Act adopts this same "implied term" prin-
ciple. By the French and Italian Codes there is release only in the case of a
cause etrangere qui ne pett hii etre imputee (Article 1147, FRENCH CIVIL CODE)
or of force mjaeure or cas fortuit (Article 1148, FRENCH CIVIL CODE).
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due to change of law.17  Domestic application of illegality is not with-
out difficulty; its position in the international conflict of laws is further
complicated. No state can make any law which of its own force is
operative in another state.' 8 But in some situations, for comity and
other reasons, courts of one jurisdiction have tended to recognize the
laws of other jurisdictions. The emergent rules have become the
Conflict of Laws.
If taken only as an area of higher ground in the general quagmire
of contract conflicts doctrines,'9 it is perhaps excusable to postulate the
maxim that in a conflict of laws situation all but the essential validity
of a contract is governed by the lez loci solutionis. This position prob-
ably represents the majority of American opinion, though Professor
Beale has stuck to the rather more formal doctrinal approach of re-
lating all matters to the law of the place of making, the lex loci con-
tractus. The British position is by no means unanimous, particularly
as regards this problem of illegality. In general, modern English
courts talk in terms of the "proper law" of the contract. That is, the
court will look to the law intended by the parties if such an expression
is made; if not, the implied intention is presumed to be the locus
solutionis-thus neatly tumbling into a position quite the twin of the
American doctrine. Of the English commentators, Dicey takes the
position that illegality at place of performance invalidates the contract,
Mann holding that this exception to the common law doctrine of im-
possibility is not valid and relying rather on the principles of the
"proper law." 20
A criticism of "proper law" has been that it is mere verbalistic
subterfuge for the essential issue-whether there has been a contra-
vention of the "public policy" of the state.21 This is apparently a re-
flection of the thesis that the exception of "change of law" in the
common law of impossibility grew out of considerations of public policy
rather than of the intentions of the parties.2 2
17. The doctrine of illegality, again, has received thorough treatment. See, e.g.:
CHESHIRE, PRrvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 345-353 (3d ed. 1947) ; Freutel, Exchange
Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARv. L. REv. 30 (1942) ;
Mann, Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L.
L. 97 (1937) ; Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement,
51 YAI. L.J. 893-923 (1942) ; Note, 3 INTRAMURAL L. REV. 62 (1947) ; Note, 34 VA.
L. REv. 697 (1948).
18. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 1 (1934).
19. "The resigned conclusion of commentators and courts alike is that the branch
of the conflict of laws dealing with contracts is probably the most confused field in
American law." Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 647 (1949).
20. Mann, Proper Law and Illegality in Private International Law, 18 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L. L. 97, 112, 113 (1937).
21. This position is found in Morris and Cheshire, The Proper Law of a Con-
tract, 56 L.Q. REv. 320 (1940).
22. Note, 3 INTRAMURAL L. REv. 62 (1947).
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Judicial utterance of these perhaps basic considerations of public
policy has been far more popular in American courts than in any
others. The Swiss courts frequently speak in terms of the ordre public,
a term of greater legal significance and validity than our vague "public
policy," but the majority opinion still looks to the intention of the
parties, the place of performance being evidence thereof.23 This theory
admits more freely than does the English "proper law" that the parties
have an autonomous choice, and consequently subjects itself to the
general criticism that the parties are given the privilege of private
legislation, a conclusion which, however just, is difficult to see as par-
ticularly objectionable.
IV
In examining litigated situations in which an exchange restriction
has been raised as a defense for an abrogation of a contractual relation-
ship,24 a categorization dependent on the "nationality" of the restric-
tion and of the governing law is found convenient. The immediately
recognizable risk arising from such division is that the latter criterion
is one of legal conclusion rather than of factual determination. How-
ever, the instances where the legal conclusion is other than that indi-
cated by this arbitrary categorization will be fully evident. "Nation-
ality" will be symbolized as "X," "Y," and "Z," and the treatment will
be fourfold.
(1) Forum X, Restricting Law X, Governing Law X. On first
blush it would appear that cases fitting these criteria are of no signifi-
cance in the field of the conflict of laws, and they have received just
such summary treatment by the commentators." There have, how-
ever, in the past few years been several important American cases
which raise questions of interpretation of domestic exchange restric-
tions as one of perhaps several defenses, and can be properly treated
here.
Hartmann v. United States2 involved interpretation of the Ex-
ecutive Orders of 1934 and 1935 effectuating America's relinquishment
of the gold standard and devaluation of her legal tender. A non-
resident alien bought United States Government bonds, issued and
23. E.g., Banco Aleman Transatlantique v. Societe de Banque Suisse, 63 Entschei-
dungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichtes II 383 (Switzerland).
24. For recent treatments of the legal problems of exchange restrictions see:
Domim, TRADING WrrII THE ENEMY IN WoRL WAR II, ch. 20 (1943); Cohn,
Currency Restrictions and the Conflict of Laws, 55 L.Q. Rav. 552 (1939) ; Freutel,
Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56 HA~v. L. REv. 30
(1942); Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 697 (1948); Comment, 47 YALE L.J. 451 (1938).
25. Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws,
56 HARV. L. Rav. 30, 39 (1942) ; Note, 34 VA. L. R"y. 697 (1948).
26. 65 F. Supp. 397 (Ct. Cl. 1946) ; see also supra note 6.
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payable in the United States in gold. Congress later prohibited fur-
ther dealings in gold, the bonds were redeemed in paper currency, and
suit was brought for the balance. The Court of Claims denied re-
covery, holding that an alien who acquires bonds issued in the United
States and subject to the law of the United States becomes, so far as
the bond is concerned, subject to such law to the same extent as an
American citizen.
There have been several cases where the effect of American war-
time exchange controls of 1941, Executive Order 8389, has been
used as a defense. In Leeds v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York
et al.2 the plaintiff was the assignee of a debt owed an alien by the de-
fendant bank. The bank insisted that the Executive Order posed the
condition precedent to such a debt transfer of a license which was in
this instance not forthcoming. It was held by the New York court
that such a license was not a condition precedent, but was only required
to enable the defendant to make payment over to plaintiff of the de-
posited debt. This follows the reasoning of the earlier Polish Relief
Commission v. Banca Nationala a Rumaniei29 which held that these
same United States exchange regulations do not prevent the levy of an
attachment which gives the court jurisdiction to dispose of funds sub-
ject to the regulations. The New York courts have also held that the
Executive Order does not affect title to choses in action nor the lia-
bility of an estate."0
(2) Forum X, Restricting Law Y, Governing Law X. There is
a distinct class of situations wherein it is no great acrobatic feat for it
to be held that by quite prosaic application of current conflict of laws
doctrine the "nationality" of the governing law is that of the forum.
That this, nevertheless, is a stated legal conclusion, to repeat our caveat
introducing this categorization, cannot be ignored. Yet the bait of
such Hornbookery as the following morsel is well nibbled, and the
trap has snared some commentators:
In cases where the contract is governed by the law of the
forum, no effect can be given to the law of the country imposing
the restriction even though the debtor be a citizen or domiciliary
of the restricting country 3' and even though it is impossible for
him to make payment."
27. 12 U.S.C.A. § 95, p. 456 h.
28. 65 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
29. 288 N.Y. 332, 43 N.E.2d 345 (1948).
30. A/S Meriland & Co. v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 189
Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; In re Mason's Estate, 194 Misc. 308,
86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup Ct. 1948). Both these cases used this point only for secondary
defense and will be dealt with further in category (4) infra.
31. Barnes v. United Steel Works Corp., 11 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
32. Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 697, 698 (1948).
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The original attack on a foreign restriction was based on theoretical
grounds designed to precede any conflicts doctrine. The position is
best stated in Tweedie Trading Co. v. McDonald Co.,.3 a case which
is still, unfortunately, cited in order to undermine any contradictory
conflicts doctrines.34 Here it was stated that foreign law in general is
not given effect because impossibility is not an excuse at common law,
but that local law is given effect because prevention by local law makes
a contractual promise illegal.35 The more conventional approach to
the situation, giving effect to the traditional conflict of laws doctrine,
lex loci solutionis, is expressed in Central Hanwver Bank & Trust Co.
v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft.3" Here the defendants had
issued bonds in the United States, payment to be made in New York.
Suit was brought for collection and defendants argued that German
exchange law prevented payment and destroyed the means of perform-
ance contemplated by the parties. It was held that German restric-
tions had no application since the contract was governed by United
States law and that payment could be made from funds outside of
Germany just as well. Moreover, the fact that the defendants might
incur German penalties was immaterial.3 Some foreign corporate
debtors have argued that the rule subjecting corporations to the laws
of their domicile requires them to submit to any restrictions imposed
by their home governments even as to assets located in the forum. But
that argument has met with no more success than the impossibility
argument.38
The restricting law in David v. Veitscher Magnesitwerke Actien
Gesellschaft 9 was a Nazi decree forbidding employee pension pay-
ments to Jews. The plaintiff employee brought the action in Penn-
sylvania against his former Austrian employer. As the plaintiff was
asking payment in the United States from assets of the defendant de-
posited in the United States the court purred place of performance, and
held for the plaintiff under Pennsylvania law. This would seem to be
quite an obvious extenuation of the conflict of law doctrine, and most
33. 114 Fed. 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1902).
34. Note, 3 INTRAM URAL L. REv. 62 (1947).
35. For opposition from an astonishing quarter, see 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS
§ 1938 (1936).
36. 15 F.Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 585 (1936).
37. This case represents and is cited by those of the more introspective national-
istic approach. Thus: ". . . [O]ur courts are not forcing him [the defendant in
the Siemens case] to violate the law of his country but are merely applying our own
law to property located here . . . Inability to marshal the necessary funds has
never been a defense to an action for failure to pay a debt." Freutel, supra note 24,
at 50.
38. E.g., Perry v. Norddeutscher Lloyd, 150 Misc. 73, 268 N.Y.S. 525 (N.Y.
City Court 1934) ; see Comment, 47 YALE L.J. 451, 454 (1938).
39. 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944); 92 U. OF PA. L. REV. 451 (1944).
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probably it was considerations of public policy which were of deter-
minative importance. This case represents the forewarned borderline
and will be mentioned again in the fourth category." The history of
the Frankman case 41 represents what is perhaps the typical judicial
maneuver-unsuccessfuly attempted there by the Court of Appeal-to
find a governing law the same as that of the forum. A relatively
plausible interpretation of the facts was used to find that the forum
was the locus solutionis.
(3) Forum X, Restricting Law Y, Governing Law Z. This situ-
ation seems to be rather less frequently before the courts, partly be-
cause the facts are more complicated and less likely to come up, and
probably also because courts in general have shied from injecting fur-
ther investigation of foreign law into the litigation and have tended
to turn to an interpretation wherein the controlling factors point to
either "X" or "Y." In the cases which do come up clearly involving
"Z," the result appears to depend, through a renvoi step, upon the
attitude taken toward exchange restrictions by the country whose law
governs the obligation.' In Lann v. United Steel Works Corp."3 the
defendant, a German corporation, issued bonds containing an optional
currency clause permitting the holder to require payment in either
Germany, Holland, or Sweden. After the defendant had called the
issue for redemption before maturity, the plaintiff presented her bonds
for payment in Holland, was refused, and subsequently brought suit
in New York. Allowing recovery, the court held that the plaintiff,
by exercising her option, had fixed the place of payment in Holland.
Consequently Dutch law governed, and under Dutch law German cur-
rency legislation was not a defense.
(4) Forum X, Restricting Law Y, Governing Law Y. The prob-
lems derivative from this type of situation are most interesting and
diverse of solution. In the past, except in extremely unusual situa-
tions,44 it has generally been held that courts will disregard foreign
exchange restrictions even though by uncontroverted conflict of laws
doctrine the governing law is that of the foreign restricting country
rather than that of the forum. This may be in part due to a wartime
40. See infra at note 45.
41. See supra at notes 3 and 4.
42. E.g., Pan-American Securities Corporation v. Fried, Krupp Aktiengesell-
schaft, 169 Misc. 445, 6 N.Y.S.2d 993 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 955, 10
N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't. 1939).
43. 166 Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
44. See, in particular, NussBAum, Moxay ix THE LAw 487 (1939): "Apart
from very special situations, the various jurisdictions confronted with this problem
have been practically unanimous in refusing to apply foreign exchange control enact-
ments."
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atmosphere where the restriction in question is quite .surely an affirm-
ative measure of economic warfare.45 Recent cases indicate a more
evenly divided judicial opinion, at least in the Anglo-American courts.
Typical of this class of cases is the "passage money" variety
where the plaintiff, a refugee, purchases a ticket from defendant, a
steamship company, entitling him to a passage from Europe to New
York. He pays for the ticket in blocked currency, and thereafter the
passage is cancelled due to the outbreak of war. But plaintiff eventually
reaches this country and sues defendant in New York for a refund of
his passage money. Defendant claims that plaintiff is entitled only to
blocked currency in Europe. In such situations the numerical weight
of authority seems to favor sustaining the defense based on exchange
control,40 but many cases have reached the opposite result.
47
There are several recent cases, other than this "passage money"
type, giving effect to a defense of exchange control impossibility where
the nationality of the governing law is the same as that of the restrict-
ing law.
In Egyes v. Magyar Nernzeti Bank et al." the plaintiff was an
American assignee of an Hungarian obligee bond holder. The suit
was brought against the Hungarian National Bank for payment in
dollars of the interest on Hungarian government bonds. Interest ac-
cumulations had been deposited by the government in the bank in
pengoes. The subsequent depression had made the pengo worthless,
and in 1935 the government declared a moratorium on any payments
in foreign currency. The pengo recouped somewhat for a time, World
War II dealt it the death blow and it has recently been replaced by the
forint. Here the court held that although the plaintiff has a lien on
the deposited pengoes, there is no obligation for the defendant to con-
trovert the moratorium decree and make payment in dollars at a rate
of exchange in line with the current forint-dollar rate. Kraus v.
Zivnostenska Banka 4 9 holds similarly where a Czechoslovakian decree
is involved. Plaintiff is suing for dollar payment of a very large
45. For further general comment see also Note, 23 VA. L. REV. 288, 289 (1937).
46. E.g. Lowenhardt v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 35 N.Y.S.2d 347
(Sup. Ct. 1942); Branderbit v. Hamburg-American Line, 31 N.Y.S.2d 588 (2d
Dep't. 1941), aff'd, 266 App. Div. 1011, 45 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't. 1943). In
Translateur v. United States Lines Co., 179 Misc. 843, 42 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct.
1943), it was held that German law was impliedly part of the contract. Also,
Steinfink v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co., 176 Misc. 413, 27 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Werfel v. Zivnostenska Bank, 260 App. Div. 747, 752, 23 N.Y.S.2d 1001,
1005 (1st Dep't. 1940).
47. E.g., Bleiweiss v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 34 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct.
1942) ; see, Weiden, Foreign Exchange Restrictions, CONTEmPORARY LAW PAMPHLET,
series 1, no. 11, p. 43.
48. 71 F. Supp. 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
49. 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
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kronen pre-war deposit made in the defendant Czechoslovakian national
bank. Here the decree already in force requiring license for such
foreign payments (noted in the Frankman case supra 5o) is upheld as
a defense by the New York court. Justification beyond pure conflict
of law theory is found in offsets to a public policy conscience such as a
specific contractual agreement to be bound by domestic exchange re-
strictions and the fact that the exchange controls were devised prior
to Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.
State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York et al.,5'
in upholding the State of the Netherlands' action to replevy securities
looted from Holland during the Nazi occupation and later coming into
American hands, again supports the foreign restriction. The govern-
ment's regulation was to the effect that all such securities were ex-
propriated by the government. Here Judge Medina's federal court
rather apologizes for its decision and points out that the foreign regu-
lation in no way opposed American public policy.
The long-standing Czechoslovakian licensing requirement is given
effect too in a recent English case, Kahler v. Midland Bank, Ltd.52
The plaintiff's Canadian government bonds were bought through a
Prague bank and deposited in the defendant London bank with title
listed as being in the Prague bank. Here the court comes perhaps
somewhat closer to grounding its decision on conflict of laws theory,
though some mention is made of England's obligation under the Inter-
national Monetary Fund agreement. 53
There are several recent cases refusing to recognize these foreign
exchange regulations though freely admitting that by traditional appli-
cation the nationality of the governing law would be that of the re-
stricting law. In re Mason's Estate 5' is a claim against a deceased's
estate on debts arising in Italy and paid by the deceased by check. The
checks were not honored on presentation by the payee due to the inter-
vening death of the drawer. The defendant administrator looks for
defense to Italian regulations existing at the time of the drawing of the
check prohibiting distribution of dollars by check. The verbalistic
argument resorted to by the New York court in refusing to sustain
this defense was that adequate showing of the foreign law was not
made; the court refused to exercise its discretionary judicial notice,
though perhaps the less formal reasons were grounded in considerations
of predispositions and public policy.
50. See note 1 supra.
51. 79 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
52. [1948] 1 All E.R. 811 (C.A.).
53. For a further dicussion of the "obligation", see infra at note 92.
54. 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1948). This category of cases
clearly overlaps category 2.
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In A/S Meriland & Co. v. Chase National Bank of City of New
York " the plaintiff, originally an Esthonian corporation, sued for its
dollar deposit account with the defendant bank. Shortly after this
deposit had been made Esthonia was incorporated into the Soviet
Union and nationalization decrees were applied to plaintiff's steamship
company. However, before effectuation of the decree, plaintiff's direc-
tors, meeting in Sweden, had transferred the seat of their corporation
to Stockholm. The defendant bank refused payment on the grounds
that Executive Order 8389 blocked the account and that the Soviet
Union's decree must be recognized as controlling. The first argument
was dispensed with by the court on the familiar basis that the Order
does not affect title.5" The second defense was quite frankly given no
weight on public policy grounds, being confiscatory and without juris-
diction as to assets in the United States.
Marcu v. Fisher 5T distinguishes the Kraus case discussed above 8
in refusing the effect of the Czechoslovakian exchange regulation by
pointing out that in the Kraus situation the control was already in
effect and was distinctly to be performed in Czechoslovakia. In this
case, then, there has been resort to perhaps more doctrinal grounds
rather than the more usual public policy arguments. The Frankrnan "
case as it came down from the Court of Appeal-is a more awkward
development of the doctrinal approach with quite apparent undercur-
rents of public policy.
V
The comparatively short history of adjudication of this type of
situation has produced a great variety of reasons for avoiding the
application of foreign exchange controls. In many instances, courts
have simply misapplied ordinary choice of law principles,"0 or employed
those which suited their purpose."' In at least one instance a court
has resorted to a concept of restitution as distinguished from damages, 62
and there has been some adoption of the jurisdictional argument men-
tioned supra in the Meriland decision. 63  In other cases courts have
55. 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
56. See supra at note 27.
57. 65 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
58. See note 49 supra.
59. Discussed supra at note 3.
60. E.g., Kassel v. N.V. Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij,
177 Misc. 92, 24 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1940), erroneously stating that a demand
for refund in New York made New York the place of performance.
61. See LORENZEN, TERRITORIALITY, PuLIc POLICY AND THE CoNIc:t OF LAWS
15 (1947).
62. Bleiweiss v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 34 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
63. Supra note 55. See also Sabl v. Leanderbank Wien Aktiengesellschaft, 30
N.Y.S.2d 608, 621 (Sup. Ct. 1941), modified, 33 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd, 266 App. Div. 832, 43 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1st Dep't 1943).
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looked to the old common law doctrines of impossibility, differentiating
between foreign and domestic municipal law. 4 It has also been sug-
gested that local courts may disregard exchange restrictions imposed
by another country because they are procedural in nature." However
exchange restrictions seem no less substantive than other rules con-
cerning the excuses for performance which are regularly applied as
part of the governing law.
66
There is an Anglo-American rule, developed from the common
law doctrine, that foreign penal and revenue laws will not be enforced,
and it is to this rule that some courts have looked in managing to dis-
regard the relevant exchange legislation. This view clearly disre-
gards the true character of exchange regulations, for they are neither
primarily for tax or revenue purposes nor penal in the sense of "de-
signed to punish offenses against the public." 68
French courts frequently apply a doctrine of territoriality-stricte
territorialitg.
Foreign exchange regulations are of fiscal character. Their
purpose is the strengthening of the financial power of the govern-
ment or country and they are handled and executed by the finan-
cial department of the government. For this reason they have
no extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, they contradict the public
policy of the other country where performance can be had or com-
pelled. These laws may de facto prevent or delay payment to be
made by a person within the country, but cannot impair con-
tractual rights or the property of persons without the country.
69
These reasons apply with greater force where a country for its
own emergency purposes is compelled to control the foreign funds
and the recognition of laws of another country would weaken the
effect of the application of its own regulations ...
The conclusion is that under the rules of conflict of laws
comity may be urged to give effect and recognition to foreign
64. Lann v. United Steel Works Corp., 166 Misc. 465, 470, 1 N.Y.S.2d 951, 957
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
65. See Bloch and Rosenberg, Current Problems of Freezing Control, 11
FORDHAM L. REv. 71 (1942); Domke, Foreign Exchange Restrictions (A Com-
parative Survey) 21 J. Comp. LEG. & INT'L. L. (3d series) 54, 58 (1939).
66. Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56
HARV. L. REV. 30, 47 (1942).
67. E.g., Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, 604, 33 N.Y.S.2d
986, 989 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 652, 56 N.E.2d 253 (1944), 47 YALE L.J.
451, 459, n. 54 (1938).
68. Weiden, Foreign Exchange Restrictions, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 559, 575 (1939);
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892). In Cermak v. Bata Akciova
Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948), the court rests its decision in part
on this principle without any particularly intelligent comment; see further reference
to this case at note 100 infra.
69. 151 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Civilsachen 116 (1936) ; Decision of
Kamnergericht, JURISTISCHE WOCHENScHRiFT 2449 (1936).
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laws, but foreign exchange legislation of other countries is purely
local and should have no extraterritorial effect unless advan-
tageous to the economic policy of the [forum] .70
That exchange controls are, on the contrary, extraterritorial in the
extreme seems apparent. Exchange controls are necessarily designed
to affect the foreign debtor.7'
Again, civil-law courts, aiming at the same result, have relied on
the theory that foreign exchange control forms part of foreign "public
law." Although exchange control is largely, perhaps mostly, a matter
of "public law" (that is, administrative law), it has important effects
on the law of contracts and with these very alterations foreign courts
are concerned. Moreover there is no plausible reason why a court in
a situation governed by foreign law should shrink from using the
"public law" provisions of the applicable legal system.
In the vast majority of cases the explanation of the refusal of
courts to give effect to foreign exchange regulations, where under
ordinary choice of law principles they are applicable, is that they are
repugnant to public policy. 72 Even where such measures are emergency
in nature, born of economic crises, they should be disregarded since
they are an attempt to support the economy of the restricting nation
at the expense of foreign creditors. Thus it has been pointed out 73
that a restriction may interfere with the interests of the domestic
creditor to a greater extent then a foreign bankruptcy law and is not
entitled to a higher degree of recognition; it is contradictory to public
policy because of its generally discriminatory aim and its role as an
economic weapon. Perhaps the war has given the greatest impetus
to this judicial delving into matters political.
There may be no moral or ethical structure directly involved in
the public policy concept, though public policy is self-motivated and
has to envisage only domestic interests; where public policies collide,
the court applies that of its own country. In Goodman v. Deutsch-
70. Bloch and Rosenberg, Current Problems of Freezing Control, 11 FORDHAM
L. REv. 71, 86-87 (1942).
71. For citations to French, Swiss, Austrian, and Norwegian cases see Nuss-
DAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW, 487 n. 3 (1939).
72. See, e.g., DomKE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II, ch. 20
(1943); Note, 3 INTRAMURAL L. REV. 62 (1947).
73. See Weiden, Foreign Exchange Restrictions, CONTEMPORARY LAW PAM-
PHuLETS, series 1, no. 11, p. 43: "Foreign Exchange Restrictions have no extraterri-
torial effect regardless of the intention of the foreign legislation. They leave the
debt intact. They regulate only the stream of capital from one country to another.
The American Court has to give judgment in its own currency. . . . The re-
strictions interfere with the interests of the American creditors to a greater extent
than a foreign bankruptcy law and are not entitled to a higher degree of recognition.
They are contradictory to our public policy because of their discriminatory effect
and their specific aims."
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Atlantische Telegraphen Ges. the court declined to resort to the public-
policy argument, since it was "not necessary to assume the pharisaical
posture and thank Providence we are not like other people." "' Never-
theless the court rejected the defendant's answer based on German
exchange control; although the contract expressly provided that the
defendant's obligations were "covered" by German law the court felt
that "covered" is not "governed," and that they were "governed" by
American law. For this reason, the court brushed aside German
exchange control legislation. Invocation of public policy would have
been far preferable to this kind of reasoning!
Public policy considerations, if further judicially spelled out, gen-
erally contain elements of concern over retroactive legislation, con-
fiscatory measures, or violation of some principle of reasonable classifi-
cation. Intimately tied to one or all of these are considerations of
expediency. So long as foreign exchange controls are deemed re-
pugnant to domestic public policy, such controls will in one way or
another be denied effect. Given current conditions of international
irresponsibility, this result is legitimate and widespread and no per-
suasive legal arguments can be advanced to condemn it. A theory that
there must be a material contact of the case with the forum to warrant
employment of the public policy test 71 is not supported by the authori-
ties, for the mere fact that the court has jurisdiction creates the neces-
sary contact to invoke public policy."' The territorial vested rights
theory, wherein it is said that no right exists to be enforced by the
forum since it has been cut down by the restriction of the place of
performance, may be circumvented by allowing recovery on a restitu-
tion theory. If there is no quasi-contractual remedy, it is generally
stated that exchange restrictions should still not be permitted to block
recovery.77 A theory that governmental recognition validates all the
actions and conduct of the government7 s does not seem to deter the
courts generally.
Contracts made subsequent to the exchange restrictions and with
knowledge thereof raise a question as to this validity, the answer to
which often hinges on the attitude of the forum toward such restric-
tions. In most instances a better course would probably be to invoke
the doctrine of in pari delicto and leave the parties as they stand.
74. 166 Misc. 509, 510, 2 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
75. See Husserl, Public Policy and Ordre Public, 25 VA. L. REv. 37, 66 (1938).
76. Cf., Oscanyan v, Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277 (1880), 38 CoL. L. REv.
1490, 1492 (1938).
77. Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56
HAgv. L. REv. 30, 59 (1942).
78. See OetJen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
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VI
Faced with a case where under ordinary choice of law principles
foreign exchange regulations are applicable, courts must draw on a
body of law confused, tortuous, and conflicting. Yet the situation
and its judicial outcome may be of considerable political importance
and are not to be dallied with in the exasperating whimsy so often set
down as considered opinion. And by no means to be exonerated are
the commentators, though their guilt, by common penal definition, is
to be measured in terms of influence on judicial decision and is to that
extent doubtful. The initial body of conflicts law where contractual
obligation is involved differs between and sometimes within jurisdic-
tions, yet is obviously of immense importance. Perhaps the most
rational approach is the American contact theory,7" which looks to the
law of the place where the most important contacts are. However,
even given such a rational solution to the initial step there is still
anarchy in the community of the commentators. Are exchange con-
trols per se immoral and to be ignored, ° can we disregard foreign
restrictions because they are purely territorial,"' or because they have
specific discriminatory and vicious aims and effects? 82 Given condi-
tions wherein there are no formalistic international obligations rele-
vant to the problem at hand there is nevertheless visible the outline of
a more rational approach. With a lessening of wartime international
animosities the bases of exchange restrictions can be more clearly
defined, indicating that they may well be more than weapons in eco-
nomic warfare; courts are given the opportunity of more objective
inspection of the public policy considerations. If they are found still
to be relevant, no abstract theory of choice of law is going to be
decisive, though it should not be obscured. If, on the other hand,
public policy loses its relevance and it appears that such restrictions
have become less monstrous and a regretable necessity in postwar
international economics-something more tha-n a purely unilateral
act 8s-then it becomes incumbent on the courts to apply a rational
choice of law doctrine and maintain the position indicated.
79. See Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatemwnt,
51 YALE L.J. 893 (1942).
80. Freutel, supra note 77, at 58.
81. Bloch and Rosenberg, supra note 70, at 87.
82. Supra note 73, at 43.
83. With the play of private international financial transactions subject to ex-
change restrictions, there is the parallel problem of what is to be the future status
of pledges, made by foreign governments under conditions of free convertibility,
that they would service external debt in dollars or other specially designated for-
eign currency. Australia has recently officially committed herself to give priority in
the disposition of available exchange reserves to the service of public debt held
abroad. New York Times, Nov. 1, 1949, p. 37, col. 5. This may well become the
basis for a new kind of indenture for the protection of bondholders abroad against
currency shortages.
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Yet from the point of view of the draftsman of the international
contract such remains largely in the realm of abstraction. That a
debtor may not rely for relief on exchange controls seems quite ap-
parent. Creditor protection is in practice currently sought in a num-
ber of ways, 4 differing to a great extent with the individual situation.
A stipulation that exchange controls will not alter the contractual
obligation is probably ineffectual, though if it specifically designates
that exchange authority approval is necessary to make the contract
operative there seems to be at least temporary protection."5 Perhaps
the most frequent combination is to require payment through a letter
of credit established in a bank of the creditor's country with the addi-
tional security of a surety foreign to the debtor's country. If the
debtor is excused on the defense of exchange control, the surety might
seek to avail himself of the same defense. However this argument is
without merit; one reason for obtaining such a surety is obviously to
protect the creditor against extraordinary political events in the debtor's
country. Exchange legislation falls within the contemplated risk. This
is an example of the familiar principle that a different law may govern
the obligations of debtor and surety."' Prepayment is of course a
solution but is generally not feasible.
8 7
There are some indications that the problem will find at least
partial solution through national and international legislation. As yet
still in the drafting stage are two complementary proposals: Rabel's
Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods, and a similar uniform
law of international conflict of laws. 8 Such uniform international
84. Derived from correspondence with several American banks with substantial
international contacts.
85. Note, 62 HARv. L. Rav. 647 (1949) (championing express stipulation in con-
tracts as to governing law).
86. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 82(f) (1941).
87. A case in point where some security was obtained by partial prepayment
is the following, taken from the files of the American Arbitration Association, 1946:
A contract between an American dealer and an American buyer for the sale of
Canadian pulp wood, stipulated in its payment terms: ". . . A letter of credit is
to be established in New York City for payment of United States funds through
the Irving Trust Company of New York; terms of payment to be as follows:-
85% to be paid upon presentation of satisfactory bills of lading indicating actual de-
livery to the Railroad Company for destination as above specified (omitted). The
final 15% to be paid upon satisfactory delivery at destination. Final measurement
and inspection to be made at destination. The seller if he so desires may have
his representative check arrival, measurement and inspection at destination ...
It is understood that the (dealer) will make adjustment of any difference in
exchange between American and Canadian funds as each draft is drawn, and that
remittance will be sent directly to (the buyer)." Thus, though exchange fluctuations
are accounted for to a certain extent in that the buyer has protected himself by re-
serving 15% of payment until delivery and could hold this if the dealer becomes,
say, insolvent in the period between drawing on the draft and remitting the ex-
change rate differential, there is still a risk on the buyer of exchange fluctuations
between the time of drawing the final 15% and remitting.
88. UNIFIcATION OF LAw, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW (1948); BAGGE, INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
(1948).
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laws have yet to be tested, though they may prove valuable even if they
remain available only for individual stipulation of controlling law. It
is to be noted, however, that a committee working for the League of
Nations a decade ago was unable to find a solution in the form of a
uniform law applicable to the problem of frustration of international
contractual obligation. 9  Perhaps the more immediately practical and
available solution is to be found in intelligent national legislation de-
fining national policy and requiring recognition of foreign restrictions
in stipulated instances. 90
The practically universal resort to exchange control has been re-
luctantly accepted if not institutionalized in resolutions of the League
of Nations 91 and in the Charter of the International Monetary Fund.92
The Charter, which has the effect of a multilateral treaty between its
signatories, recognizes that these restrictions are manifestations of the
basic imbalance of world trade which must in the long run seek a more
basic cure,9" but it further speaks of exchange control as hampering
and perpetuating this imbalance.94 Under the Fund Agreement restric-
tions on "current transactions" (commercial transactions) are per-
mitted during the "transitional period" '5 and if a currency becomes so
scarce that the Fund will have to apportion its supply among the mem-
bers. The objectives are quite apparently flouted in two respects.
First, Article VIII section 2(b) encourages members to "co-
operate" in effectuating their mutual exchange controls.9  Second, and
most important in its effects on the conflicts of laws problems, is the
following sentence from Article VIII section 2(b) (1):
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any mem-
ber and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agree-
ment, shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.97
89. See PROJET D'UNE Loi INTERNATIONALE SUR LA VENTE, 32 et seq. (1935);
RAPPORT SUR L'ACTIVITE DE L'INsTITUT INTERNATIONALE DE ROME POUR L'UNIFICATION
DU DROIT PRIVt 10 (1938-39); GuTTRIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 67 (1946).
90. Zepos, Frustration of Contract it Comparative Law and in the New Greek
Civil Code of 1946, 11 MOD. L. REv. 36 (1948).
91. REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL 3 (League of Nations Publications II A:
Economic and Financial No. 10) (1938); 1937 League of Nations General As-
sembly.
92. UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE: FINAL Acr AND
RELATED DOCUMENTS, Publication 2187 (U.S. Dep't State 1944).
93. Article I (ii).
94. Article VIII § 2(a).
95. Article VII § 3(b), and Article XIV § 2, both referred to in Article VIII
§2(a). By Article XIV § 4 the transitional period ends five years after the Fund
begins operations.
96. The Fund thus appears to give preference to special bipartite and multi-
partite arrangements.
97. A discerning analysis of this section has been made by Professor Nuss-
baum in Exchange Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J.
421 (1950). Its effect is, however, at best largely speculative and can be dealt
with here only summarily.
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An inspection of this reveals many uncertainties. "Exchange con-
tracts" probably was not intended to include those transactions which,
though often governmentally regulated, are not directly concerned with
international media of payment.9" So if such transactions, involving,
say, securities or merchandise, are invalid under the law of the "country
of the currency", other countries are not compelled to hold them, by the
Agreement, unenforceable. Further, this section apparently envisages
validation of "exchange controls . . . maintained or imposed consis-
tently with this Agreement", thus giving it a retroactive effect, though
many of the "maintained" restrictions will not be "consistent" with the
Agreement.99
The efficacy of international treaties on domestic legal institutions
is generally treated with circumspection by the courts. The Fund
Agreement is no exception, for, though its applicability is often urged
by the litigant, courts have thus far found other more convenient
grounds for decision.100 The Frankmau case perhaps gave greatest
weight to the Agreement, though the upper court chose to look to other
aspects in its reversal. This zenith was reached in the statement of
the lower court: "The Bretton Woods Agreement shows that such
restrictions (namely, exchange restriction of member states generally)
are honored by the members of the International Monetary Fund," a
position far too generalized in the light of the ambiguities of the Agree-
ment. It would seem that, in fact, Article VIII by itself offers scant
succour to the anemic international contractor.
VII
This area of investigation, involving international conflicts of law
stemming so apparently, even to the legalist, from domestic economic
problems, affords an unusually vivid view of the unveiled considera-
98. This would include contracts for sale of foreign securities or contracts for
import or export, particularly where price determination is in foreign currency.
99. In the Frankman case supra notes 3 and 4, for example, reference is to ex-
change controls held over from the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. As to the
effectiveness of the Agreement, see also: EviTT, EXCHANGE AND TRADE CONTROL IN
THEORY AND PRAcTIcE (1945); COMMERCIAL POLICY IN THE POsT-WAR WORLD
(League of Nations Publications II A: Economic and Financial Committee) (1945) ;
METZLER, EXCHANGE RATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, POSTWAR
ECONOMIC STUDIES No. 7 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
1947).
100. E.g., Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681, 64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup.
Ct. 1946); Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
".. . The court of no country executes the penal (or the revenue) laws of an-
other. . . . If the . . . Bretton Woods (Agreements) are to change that rule,
I will at least await a decision of some appellate court blazing that trail or a case
before me in which that point is briefed and decision of it is actually necessary;"
Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 260 App. Div. 747, 23 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1940) ; Kahler
v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1948] 1 All E.R. 811 (C.A.).
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tions of public policy applied by the courts. When allusion is made to
traditional conflict of laws rules it but thinly hides the decisive factors;
more often than not these factors of public policy are stated as primary.
As has been indicated before, this bold approach was made possible
by its inception in a period of selfrighteousness, of international dis-
trust, of depression and war, giving rise to foreign exchange restric-
tions. In general there was refusal to give effect to restrictions dis-
criminating against persons and property within the jurisdiction-
moral and actual--of the court. There came to be a rationale, perhaps
justifiable in time of war, which proclaimed as contra to public policy
any foreign restriction which if enforced would give a nominal result
different from a purely domestic treatment.
But the immorality of exchange control is no longer fresh; the
evil of its conception fades. International organization has bestowed
upon it a modicum of legitimacy. Judicial decision which has looked
to purely domestic measure in applying or ignoring the doctrines of
conflicts of law, must now look to situations which persist and grow
in the international community even among friends. To give direction
and vigor to the solutions of legal problems arising from exchange
restrictions the prime standard must be that of legitimacy in the eyes
of international organization. The Bretton Woods Agreement falters,
and by precise interpretation becomes inadequate. But approval or
disapproval of exchange restrictions through the medium of the multi-
lateral treaty commitment that is the charter of the modern interna-
tional organization must replace the public policy predispositions of the
courts of the past.
